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Abstract 
In this study, 6-month-olds’ ability to mentally rotate objects was investigated using the 
violation-of-expectation paradigm. Forty infants watched an asymmetric object being moved 
straight down behind an occluder. When the occluder was lowered, it revealed the original 
object (possible) or its mirror image (impossible) in one of five orientations. Whereas half of 
the infants were allowed to manually explore the object prior to testing, the other half was 
only allowed to observe the object. Results showed that infants with prior hands-on 
experience looked significantly longer at the mirror image, while infants with observational 
experience did not discriminate between test events. These findings demonstrate that 6-
month-olds’ mental rotations benefit from manual exploration, highlighting the importance of 
motor experience for cognitive performance. 
-------------- 
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Touching Up Mental Rotation: 
Effects of Manual Experience on 6-Month-Old Infants’ Mental Object Rotation 
Research on mental imagery has long been confined to introspective approaches, until 
Shepard and his colleagues (Cooper & Shepard, 1973; Shepard & Metzler, 1971) came up 
with an innovative paradigm that allowed for a more objective approach to mental processes. 
In their task, participants were instructed to discriminate as fast and accurately as possible 
whether a rotated figure was exactly the same or a mirror image of an original upright figure. 
The time that adults typically required for this discrimination increased linearly with the 
angular difference between the stimuli. This indicated that adults mentally rotated one of the 
stimuli in order to align and compare it with the other, and that such mental transformations 
are subject to the same spatiotemporal constraints as movements in the physical world. That 
is, the further an object has to be mentally rotated the more time it takes, just like object 
transformations in the physical world. Thus, research on mental rotation abilities is not only 
interesting in its own right; it also provides access to and evidence for analog mental 
representations in general and the ability to dynamically transform such images, which is a 
fundamental process of our thinking.  
To date, only a few studies have been undertaken to investigate infants’ mental 
rotation abilities (e.g., Moore & Johnson, 2008, 2011; Quinn & Liben, 2008). Thus, the 
question of whether infants use analog representations similar to adults (e.g., Kosslyn, 1980, 
1981) is far from answered. To find out more about the early developments of mental rotation 
abilities is important in light of recent evidence showing (a) considerable gender and socio-
economic differences in spatial tasks, notably those involving mental rotation (e.g., Levine, 
Vasilyeva, Lourenco, Newcombe, & Huttenlocher, 2005) and (b) evidence that spatial 
abilities are related to success in geometry and verbal problems (e.g., Delgado & Prieto, 
2004) and are predictive of later careers in STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering, and 
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Mathematics) disciplines (Shea, Lubinski, & Benbow, 2001; Wai, Lubinski, & Benbow, 
2009). Research on the origins of spatial performance differences and factors that facilitate 
mental rotation performance is essential for designing early interventions and providing equal 
opportunities for spatial learning early in life. 
The Development of Mental Rotation 
In developmental research, classic mental rotation tasks, or slightly adapted versions 
thereof, were successfully applied down to the age of 4 to 5 years (e.g., Estes, 1998; Frick, 
Daum, Walser, & Mast, 2009; Funk, Brugger, & Wilkening, 2005; Kosslyn, Margolis, 
Barrett, Goldknopf, & Daly, 1990; Marmor, 1975, 1977; Platt & Cohen, 1981). A general 
conclusion that can be drawn from these studies is that around this age, children are using 
mental rotation, although they do so at a slower speed than adults. Furthermore, as reviewed 
by Newcombe and Frick (2010), there are still important individual differences (see also 
Estes, 1998; Frick, Ferrara, & Newcombe, 2012), and mental rotation abilities have been 
shown to continuously strengthen through early childhood (Estes, 1998; Levine, 
Huttenlocher, Taylor, & Langrock, 1999; Okamoto-Barth & Call, 2008). 
To date, few studies have investigated mental rotation in infants and toddlers. 
Naturally, the research method has to be adapted to this very young age range, given that 
infants (1) cannot press buttons for “same” and “different” responses, and (2) cannot be 
verbally instructed to distinguish between identical and mirror reversed objects. To solve the 
first problem, infant studies have taken advantage of the fact that babies tend to distinguish 
novel from familiar objects, by looking at them for different amounts of time, or to react with 
prolonged looking times to events that violate their expectations. In order to solve the second 
methodological challenge, researchers came up with various ploys to prompt infants to 
perform a mental rotation.  
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One way is to show an object initially moving in a rotational trajectory, and to test 
whether infants can rotate the object beyond the presented movement. This approach was 
taken by Rochat and Hespos (1996), who presented events in which an object rotated through 
a 120° arc and continued its trajectory for 60 more degrees behind an occluder. When 
revealed at the end of the event, the object was in a probable or improbable orientation. 
Results showed that infants as young as 4 months looked longer at the improbable than at the 
probable outcome, suggesting that they formed dynamic mental representations of the events 
and were able to track and anticipate the final orientation outcome of an invisible 
transformation. These results were interpreted as first evidence of “some rudiments of mental 
rotation” in infancy. Interestingly, Hespos and Rochat (1997) showed in a follow-up study, 
that when the invisible part of the transformation was increased from 60° to 150°, 4-month-
olds failed to discriminate between probable and improbable orientations of the object. In 
contrast, extending the invisible part of the trajectory did not affect performance of 6-month-
olds. The authors ruled out that increasing memory load due to longer retention intervals 
accounted for these results given that time of occlusion was held constant. These findings 
suggest that 4-month-olds’ success in anticipating the orientation outcome was limited to 
relatively small transformation angles.  
A more recent study by Moore and Johnson (2008) showed that 5-month-old boys 
were able to mentally rotate an object. After being habituated to an object that underwent a 
240° rotation, male infants looked longer at a mirror image of the object that rotated through 
the previously unseen 120°. However, this and the above mentioned infant studies differ from 
mental rotation studies in adults and older children in that they presented a substantial 
proportion of the rotational movement of the test object in habituation or familiarization 
trials. Thus, infants might have simply extrapolated the presented movement, which may be 
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an easier task than initiating a mental rotation (cf. Bremner, Bryant, Mareschal, & Volein, 
2007). 
In a study by Quinn and Liben (2008) this possibility was attenuated, because the 
rotation of the object was made plausible by showing seven different static views in steps of 
45°, before showing the test orientation. In line with Moore and Johnson (2008), results 
suggested that 3- to 4-month-old boys but not girls looked longer at the mirror reversed 
compared to the original stimulus. Even though in this task only static stimuli were shown, it 
still differed from the original mental rotation task insofar as several orientations were 
presented. As a result, the angular difference between the test orientation and the closest 
presented orientations was relatively small (i.e., 45°), and the test orientation could have been 
inferred by interpolating two presented stimuli.  
A similar method was used in a recent study (Schwarzer, Freitag, & Buckel, 2010), in 
which the influence of crawling on 9-month-old infants’ mental rotation abilities was tested. 
The authors used the same 3D objects as in the study of Moore and Johnson (2008). 
However, exactly as in the study by Quinn and Liben (2008), they showed a series of static 
pictures of the rotated object throughout habituation. Results showed that crawling males 
looked longer at the mirror object, suggesting that mental rotation abilities are linked to the 
development of self-locomotion. 
Taking a different approach, Frick and Wang (2012) prompted infants to expect a 
rotational transformation by placing an object on a turntable, before completely hiding the 
object and turning the turntable by 90°. This procedure avoided showing the object in motion 
or even different orientations, and results indicated that with this procedure it was not until 15 
to 16 months that infants looked longer at the improbable orientation outcome. Furthermore, 
this study showed that 13- to 14-month-olds who had hands-on training with the turntable 
prior to the mental rotation task, looked longer at an improbable compared to a probable 
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outcome. In contrast, observational experience did not have the same beneficial effects. 
These results suggested that active manual experience increased infants’ ability to predict the 
outcome of a rotation event. 
In fact, this finding is in line with recent research showing that motor activity and 
motor constraints play an influential role especially in young children’s mental 
transformation abilities. For instance, mental object rotation was strongly influenced by 
simultaneous hand movements in young children up until about 8 years of age, but less so in 
older children and adults (Frick, Daum, Walser, et al., 2009; Frick, Daum, Wilson, & 
Wilkening, 2009). Moreover, mental rotation of hand stimuli has been found to depend on the 
participants’ own hand postures (Funk et al., 2005) and this effect was more pronounced in 
kindergarteners than in adults. Similarly, 6- and 7-year-olds’ as well as adults’ mental 
rotation of hand stimuli has been shown to be affected by biomechanical constraints (Krüger 
& Krist, 2009). Again, response time differences between biomechanically awkward and 
comfortable hand orientations were more pronounced in 7-year-olds than in adults. 
The idea that sensorimotor or action-based experience is important for the 
development of cognitive abilities is not a new one. Already Piaget and Inhelder (1956/1948, 
1971/1966; Piaget, 1952/1936) claimed that cognitive abilities emerge from sensorimotor 
experience and viewed movement as the source of the most elementary knowledge. 
Furthermore, they believed that representations are symbolic imitations of previously 
executed actions. Similar propositions can be found in the work of other researchers (e.g., 
Bruner, Olver, & Greenfield, 1966; Gibson & Pick, 2000; Kosslyn, 1978, 1980). Indeed, 
there is evidence that the onset of independent locomotion has a strong influence on spatial 
abilities, such as distance perception and spatial search (for a review see Campos, Anderson, 
Barbu-Roth, Hubbard, Hertenstein, & Witherington, 2000) and that manual exploration 
experience affects infants’ perception of goal-directed action (e.g., Sommerville, Woodward, 
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& Needham, 2005). However, there is little research on effects of manual experience on 
mental rotation in infants thus far.  
The Present Study 
The aim of the present study was to clarify whether and under which conditions 6-
month-old infants are able to mentally rotate objects, using a paradigm that was adapted to 
the young age of our participants, but still as comparable to the classic mental rotation 
paradigm as possible (cf. Shepard & Metzler, 1971). We investigated 6-month-old infants’ 
mental rotation abilities, using the violation-of-expectation paradigm. Infants saw video 
sequences with a simple asymmetrical object. The object was presented by a human hand, 
moved straight down, and then disappeared behind an occluder. When the occluder was 
lowered, the object (possible event) or its mirror version (impossible event) was revealed in 
one of five different orientations. Thus, a total of ten test events were presented to each 
infant. If 6-month-olds were capable of mental rotation, we expected them to look longer at 
the impossible than at the possible outcome. That is, after mentally rotating the object and 
recognizing that a different object is presented at the end of the impossible event, infants’ 
expectation of object consistency should be violated. We would therefore expect prolonged 
looking times toward the impossible test event, because infants need time to process the 
unexpected outcome. If, however, infants were not able to mentally grasp the object’s change 
in orientation, we expected no differences in looking times between possible and impossible 
events, because both objects should be regarded as new. 
In contrast to previous studies (Hespos & Rochat, 1997; Moore & Johnson, 2008; 
Rochat & Hespos, 1996), infants did not see any rotational movement of the test object 
around the same axis as in the test events. In addition, the test object was never shown in any 
other orientation but upright, which contrasts with methods used in recent studies (Quinn & 
Liben, 2008; Schwarzer et al., 2010). Instead, the object was moved behind an occluder on a 
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vertical translational trajectory. A rotation behind the occluder was made plausible to the 
infants by familiarizing infants with the rotational movement using a different object prior to 
testing. This procedure aimed to investigate whether 6-month-old infants are able to initiate a 
mental rotation of objects by themselves, and thus the present study is the first infant study 
that never implied a rotation of the test object in the habituation or familiarization phase. 
We investigated effects of multiple angles of rotation by presenting objects that varied 
in orientation from 0° up to 180°, in steps of 45°, in a within-subject design. This design 
allowed for investigating whether results can be extended to larger angles than previously 
tested (e.g., 45° in Quinn & Liben, 2008), and whether performance would break down at 
larger angles of rotation (cf. Hespos & Rochat, 1997, between subjects). In the latter case, we 
would expect looking time differences between impossible and possible events for small 
changes in orientation, but no differences for larger changes. Surprisingly, orientation has 
never been varied within subjects in infant research before, even though such an approach is 
typical for mental rotation studies with adult participants and has the potential to yield 
valuable information about the extent of mental rotation abilities. 
And finally, we explored effects of manual experience on infants’ mental rotation 
performance. Frick and Wang (2012) found effects of hands-on experience on 13- to 14-
months-olds’ mental rotation abilities. However, to date it is unclear whether infants younger 
than 13 months would profit from manual exploration. In the present study, we tested infants 
at the age of 6 months, when they had just started to develop their systematic grasping skills, 
and coordinated manipulation of objects under visual control emerges (cf. Needham, Barrett, 
& Peterman, 2002; Piaget & Inhelder, 1956/1948; Rochat, 1989). In order to explore the 
ways in which manual experience and exploration promote mental rotation abilities in young 
infants, half of the infants were allowed to touch an asymmetrical object prior to testing and 
the other half was only allowed to observe the same test object.  
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Method 
Participants. Forty healthy and full-term infants (mean age = 5 months and 30 days; 
SD = 9 days) participated in the present study. Twenty infants were assigned to the manual 
exploration condition (mean age = 6 months and 3 days; SD = 9 days) and twenty to the 
observation condition (mean age = 5 months and 27 days; SD = 8 days). Half of the infants 
were boys (mean age = 5 months and 30 days; SD = 8 days) and half were girls (mean age = 
5 months and 30 days, SD = 11 days). Three additional infants were tested but excluded from 
the sample due to experimenter error (1) and failure to pass the familiarization criterion (2). 
According to this criterion, infants were excluded if they looked less than the duration of one 
complete event presentation on two out of three familiarization trials, in order to make sure 
they had a chance to become familiar with the general pattern of subsequent trials. Infants 
were recruited from a pool of families who had volunteered to take part in studies of child 
development. Infants were predominantly Caucasian, from middle-class backgrounds, and 
lived in urban and suburban areas of a Swiss city. Parents filled out a consent form prior to 
the study and infants received a small toy and a certificate for their participation.  
Stimuli. The object used for the familiarization trials was symmetrical and had the 
form of the letter “T”. The T-object was made of plywood, painted blue, and was 10 cm high 
and 7.5 cm wide. The objects used for the test trials were two asymmetrical objects in the 
shape of a “p” and a “q”, made of plywood, and painted blue in front (see Figure 1). Each 
object was 10 cm high and 5 cm wide. In order to have two objects that were mirror objects 
and could not be brought into congruency with each other by rotation along any axis, the 
backs of the p and q were constructed to look and feel very different: five concentric plywood 
circles of decreasing diameter, painted alternating in red and yellow, were glued onto the 
yellow backs of the objects. The red and yellow circles made the back visually distinct, and 
the three dimensional step-structure made it haptically distinct from the front.  
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Apparatus. Events were filmed on a stage with a wooden backboard (66 cm high and 
100 cm wide) that was painted white but still showed some of its wooden structure. An 
opening (20 cm wide and 20 cm high) at the center of the bottom edge of the backboard 
allowed an experimenter to insert her right arm in order to present and move the objects. An 
invisible glass pane that was mounted parallel to the backboard aided the experimenter in 
holding the object steadily by slightly pressing it against the glass, and allowed for smooth 
object movements in the picture plane. At the beginning of each trial (except for the second 
and third familiarization trial) a gray occluder (21 cm wide and 21 cm high), placed parallel 
in front of the glass pane, completely covered the view of the smaller cut-out in the 
backboard.  
Events. Events were short video sequences that were edited using the program Adobe 
Premiere Pro CS3. Each infant saw three different familiarization events followed by ten test 
events. During the first familiarization event, a human hand presented the T-shaped object on 
top of the screen (1 s). The T was grasped halfway down the stem, with a precision grip from 
behind, so that the full T-shape was visible. Next, the T was moved down vertically by 30 cm 
(3 s), disappeared behind the occluder, and continued its movement (0.5 s) until it reached the 
middle of the occluder. After a short time interval (1 s) the occluder dropped (0.3 s), and 
revealed the object. In the first familiarization trial the object was revealed in the same 0° 
orientation as it disappeared and presented for 3 s.  
During the second familiarization event, no occluder was present, so that infants were 
able to see the whole trajectory of the object, as well as the hand that moved the object at all 
times. Similar to the first familiarization event, the T was held steadily (1 s) and moved 
straight down (3.5 s). At the point where the object would have reached the midpoint of the 
occluder, the hand turned the object 30° clockwise in the picture plane (1 s) and then paused 
(3.3 s).  
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In the third familiarization event, the human hand held the T at the top of the screen (1 
s), moved it straight down (3.5 s), rotated it 150° clockwise in the picture plane (1 s), and 
held it steadily in this final orientation (3.3 s).  
Each familiarization event lasted a total of 8.8 s and was shown repeatedly, with a 
black screen of 1.2 s between each repetition. The events shown aimed at familiarizing 
infants with the occlusion event, the straight-down movement, as well as the rotational 
movement. Note that these rotational movements were only shown using a different object 
(the “T”-object) and different rotation angles (30° and 150°) than those used in subsequent 
test events.  
The test events were identical to the first familiarization event, except for the objects 
used and the outcomes infants saw after the occluder was lowered. In the test events, one of 
the asymmetrical objects in the shape of the letters “p” or “q” (depending on condition) was 
presented at the top of the screen (1 s), moved straight down (3 s), and disappeared behind 
the occluder. After enough time for the experimenter to move the object to the middle of the 
occluder (0.5 s) and rotate it behind the occluder (1 s), the occluder was lowered (0.3 s). 
Either the same object (possible event) or its mirror version (impossible event) was revealed 
in one of five different orientations (for an example of the test events, see Figure 2). Each test 
event was shown once and infants watched the final paused scene with the object remaining 
in its outcome orientation. The beginning of the event as well as the dropping of the occluder 
was accompanied by a ding sound (Windows Media ding.wav) in order to direct infants’ 
attention to the object as well as the outcome of the disclosure. 
Procedure. At the beginning of the experiment, infants were given the opportunity to 
thoroughly encode the test object that they would later see disappearing behind the occluder 
(i.e., p or q, depending on condition). An experimenter turned the object in front of the 
infants, rotating it along its vertical axis for a total of two minutes. The main purpose of this 
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encoding phase was to make sure that infants saw that the back and front sides of the object 
were very different, so that a rotation around the vertical axis could not be assumed as a 
possible explanation in the case of the “impossible” event. During this presentation, half of 
the infants were allowed to touch and manually encode the object (manual exploration 
condition) and half of the children were only allowed to observe the object (observation 
condition). In the observation condition, infants were prevented from grasping the object by 
means of a Plexiglas window (75 cm high and 50 cm wide) that was mounted at the edge of 
the table. The experimenter moved the object behind this window analogously to the manual 
exploration condition.  
Immediately after the encoding phase, infants proceeded to the mental rotation test. 
Infants were seated on the caregiver’s lap approximately 60 cm in front of a 30-inch TFT 
computer screen. Dark brown curtains hung from the ceiling to the floor, fully enclosed the 
viewing area, and also covered the area around the screen, thus minimizing visual distraction. 
A camera centered 3.5 cm above the computer screen was used to observe and record infants’ 
looking behavior. Each trial began with an attention getter (rapidly alternating geometric 
shapes) directing infants’ attention to the upper part of the computer screen – the position 
where the object would appear. Once the infant looked at the attention getter, the 
experimenter started the trial by pressing a computer key. Recording of the infants’ looking 
time began as soon as the trial started. Familiarization and test trials ended when the infant 
looked away for 2 consecutive seconds or when 60 seconds had elapsed.  
Infants’ looking times were measured online by the experimenter. Videos of twenty 
randomly chosen infants were coded off-line by a second naïve experimenter, in order to 
calculate inter-rater reliability (10 infants in each condition). The average Pearson correlation 
of looking times during test trials between the two observers was r = .95 in each condition. 
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Design. Each participant saw ten test trials that varied in outcome orientation (0°, 45°, 
90°, 135°, 180°, clockwise in picture plane) and type of test event (possible, impossible). 
Possible and impossible events of each orientation were paired and presented one after the 
other. However, it was counterbalanced between participants in which order they saw the 
different events and outcome orientations. Five orders of outcome orientations were 
determined using a Latin-square to ensure that each order started with a different orientation. 
The order in which participants saw the possible (p) and impossible (i) events followed one 
of two patterns (pi ip ip pi ip – or – ip pi pi ip pi). Furthermore, it was varied between 
participants (and held constant within participants) whether they always saw the q-object or 
the p-object disappearing behind the occluder. This resulted in 20 different combinations, 
each of which was randomly assigned to one participant in each the manual exploration and 
observation condition. 
Results 
Test events. The following analyses are based on infants’ looking times at the final 
paused scenes in the test trials after the occluder had dropped. If an infant had looked away 
for more than two consecutive seconds before the occluder was lowered and therefore missed 
a considerable part of the event, missing values were replaced by the average looking times 
of infants for that particular orientation, test event, and condition. This was the case in 5% of 
the possible test trials and 7% of the impossible trials. None of the children ever watched the 
test events for the whole 60 s. 
A preliminary ANOVA showed that the counterbalanced variables sex, type of 
disappearing object (p or q) and order of the test events (possible vs. impossible first) had no 
main effects on infants’ looking times during test trials, all Fs < 1, and did not interact with 
the variables of primary interest: test event (possible vs. impossible), orientation (0°, 45°, 
Running head: SIX-MONTH-OLD INFANTS’ MENTAL OBJECT ROTATION 15 
90°, 135°, 180°), or experience (manual exploration vs. observation), all Fs < 1.76, all ps > 
.14. Therefore, these variables were not included in the following analyses.  
An ANOVA with the within-subject variables test event (possible vs. impossible) and 
orientation (0°, 45°, 90°, 135°, 180°), and the between-subjects variable experience (manual 
exploration vs. observation) was calculated. The ANOVA revealed a significant main effect 
of test event, F(1, 38) = 6.00, p < .05, η2 = .14, with infants looking longer at the impossible 
(M = 7.91, SE = 0.74) than at the possible test events (M = 6.64, SE = 0.64). Furthermore, 
there was a significant main effect of experience, F(1, 38) = 5.71, p < .05, η2 = .13, showing 
that infants with manual experience looked longer at the test events (M = 8.82 s, SE = 0.91) 
than infants who had observational experience (M = 5.74 s, SE = 0.91). Moreover, the 
analysis yielded a significant interaction between test event and experience, F(1, 38) = 5.12, p 
< .05, η2 = .12, showing that infants with different prior experience differed in their looking 
behavior during the test events (see Figure 3). There was no statistically significant effect of 
orientation, F(4, 152) = 1.50, p = .20, η2 = .04, and no interaction of orientation and test 
event, F < 1 (see Figure 4). All other interactions were non-significant, all Fs < 1.2, all ps > 
.35.  
In order to interpret the above interaction between test event and experience, pairwise 
tests (Bonferroni corrected) were performed, showing that infants in the manual exploration 
condition looked significantly longer at the impossible (M = 10.04 s, SE = 1.27) than at the 
possible test events (M = 7.60 s, SE = 1.18), p < .01. In contrast, infants in the observation 
condition did not differ in their looking times during possible (M = 5.69 s, SE = 0.51) and 
impossible test events (M = 5.78 s, SE = 0.77), p = .90. These results were confirmed by non-
parametric tests, showing that in the manual exploration condition, 15 out of 20 participants 
on average looked longer at the impossible than at the possible test events (75%, Binomial, p 
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< .05). In the observation condition, 9 out of 20 infants, looked longer at the impossible than 
the possible test events, which did not differ from chance (45%, Binomial, p > .05). 
Familiarization. To find out whether infants in the two conditions differed in terms of 
their looking times during the three familiarization trials, a repeated measures ANOVA with 
familiarization event (1, 2, and 3) as within-subject variable and experience (manual 
exploration vs. observation) as between-subject variable was calculated. The dependent 
variable was infants’ looking times at the final paused scene after the occluder was lowered 
or after the object had stopped moving (in familiarization events 2 and 3). The ANOVA 
revealed a near significant effect of experience, F(1, 38) = 3.97, p = .054, η2 = .10. Infants in 
the manual exploration condition tended to look longer throughout the familiarization phase 
(M = 23.81, SE = 2.63) than infants in the observation condition (M = 16.39, SE = 2.63). 
However, the analysis yielded no main effect or interaction of familiarization event, both Fs 
< 1.4, both ps > .27. Thus, infants of both experiments did not differ in their looking times 
toward a particular familiarization event. 
Encoding phase. Finally, it was investigated whether there were differences in how 
much infants made use of the opportunity to visually and manually encode the object at the 
outset of the experiment. In the manual exploration condition, infants on average touched the 
object for 68.84 s (SD = 20.35, ranging from 28.72 to 103.68) and looked at the object for 
86.50 s (SD = 17.27, ranging from 55.76 to 115.76). In the observation condition, infants on 
average touched the window for 53.53 s (SD = 29.52, ranging from 0 to 103.04) and looked 
at the object for 85.70 s (SD = 16.39, ranging from 44.76 to 111.32). A t-test comparing the 
looking times toward the object showed that infants with manual and observational 
experience did not differ, t(38) = 0.15, p = .88, d = .05. Furthermore, t-tests yielded no 
significant sex differences in the visual attention towards the object, t(38) = 1.19, p = .24, d = 
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.38, or in the duration infants touched the object in the manual exploration group, t(18) = 
0.83, p = .42, d = .39.  
Discussion 
Results of the present study suggest that 6-month-old infants are capable of mentally 
rotating objects from a static upright position regardless of outcome orientation, but only if 
they are given the opportunity to manually explore the test object beforehand. The present 
findings are in line with previous studies reviewed in the introduction, insofar as they are 
showing that even young infants can succeed in mental rotation tasks. However, they qualify 
and extend previous results in a number of ways.  
First, our result showed that a looking-time pattern indicative of mental rotation was 
only found for infants who had previously gathered hands-on experience with the test object, 
but not for those who only had observational experience. These results are in line with results 
from Frick and Wang (2012) showing that hands-on experience appears to be instrumental in 
13- to 14-months-olds’ mental rotation performance. However, our results extend these 
findings by showing that manual experience facilitates mental rotation performance in infants 
as young as 6 months old. 
Second, to our knowledge the present study is the first to test multiple rotation angles 
in a within-subject design with infants, although this is standard in mental rotation studies 
with adults. In presenting objects that varied in orientation from 0° up to 180°, we were able 
to show that infants’ mental rotation abilities can even be observed with large angles. 
Interestingly, there was no effect of object orientation nor interaction of event and 
orientation, which suggests that infants’ mental rotation performance was not significantly 
affected by the angle of rotation. In this regard, it should be noted that the looking times used 
as dependent variable in the present paradigm must not be confused with response times in 
classic mental rotation paradigms. There, a linear increase in response times is generally 
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taken as evidence for the use of a mental rotation strategy (e.g., Estes, 1998; Shepard & 
Metzler, 1971), as it takes more time to simulate a longer than a shorter movement. The 
looking times used here, on the other hand, are assumed to be indicative of the time infants 
need to cognitively process the presented event outcomes. Thus, there could be an increase in 
looking times for larger degrees of rotation, but looking times are not necessarily a direct 
measure of the time needed to mentally simulate the rotational movement. Therefore, our 
finding of no significant increase in looking times with increasing object orientation does not 
imply that infants did not mentally rotate the stimuli. Rather, the absence of a significant 
main effect of orientation or interaction with event (in combination with the significant main 
effect of event) suggests that infants were capable of differentiating impossible and possible 
events regardless of outcome orientation, and that performance did not break down after a 
certain degree of rotation.  
However, even though infants’ discriminations of impossible and possible test events 
did not differ as a function of orientation, group means suggest less pronounced effects for 
the 45° and 180° orientations. A possible explanation why some infants might not have 
differentiated the possible and impossible events in the 45° orientation may be that, if infants 
mentally continued the vertical movement of the disappearing p-object (in 0° orientation), the 
round part of the p-object would have ended up in a similar position as the round part of the 
q-object after a 45° rotation. In other words, because the round part of the p-object protruded 
to the right and the one of the q-object protruded to the left, the switch from a 0° p-object to a 
45° q-object might have gone unnoticed. Similarly, the 180° trials presented a special case, 
because in the impossible event the round part remained on the same side of the vertical line, 
whereas in the possible event it switched sides. This switch might have been visually salient 
and caused some infants to look longer at the possible outcome. Similar results have been 
obtained with older participants. For example, a study with 6- to 9-year-olds (Perrucci, 
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Agnoli, & Albiero, 2008) revealed lower accuracies for different than for same images at 
180°, and in general lower accuracies and longer response times on 180° trials. The authors 
assumed that some participants might have applied a less successful “flipping” strategy (cf. 
Loring-Meier & Halpern, 1999, for similar results in adults). However, such strategies could 
not have been very frequent in the present study, else we would have found a significant 
opposite pattern of looking longer at the possible events.  
Third, the present results add to previous findings by showing that young infants can 
perform mental rotation even under harder conditions. Many of the previous studies with 
young infants differed from studies with older children and adults, in that a substantial 
proportion of the rotational movement was presented (Hespos & Rochat, 1997; Moore & 
Johnson, 2008; Rochat & Hespos, 1996). The presentation of rotational movement might 
have had the effect that the appearance of the object in the test orientation could have been 
inferred by extrapolating the presented movement. The present study showed that such a 
presentation of the test object was not necessary, and that 6-month-olds were able to perform 
a mental rotation, even though infants only saw the test object in upright orientation and had 
to initiate a mental rotation by themselves. The only occasion for infants to see a rotational 
movement in the picture plane was in the second and third familiarization trials; however, for 
those a different symmetrical object was used.  
Finally, previous studies with young infants (Moore & Johnson, 2008; Quinn & 
Liben, 2008; Schwarzer et al., 2010) found looking time patterns that were indicative of 
mental rotation only in boys but not in girls. Our results contradict these findings, by showing 
that male and female infants did not differ in their looking times toward possible and 
impossible events. However, our results are in line with findings from a number of studies in 
infants (Frick & Wang, 2012; Hespos & Rochat, 1997; Rochat & Hespos, 1996) and children 
(Estes, 1998; Frick, Daum, Walser, et al., 2009; Kosslyn et al., 1990; Platt & Cohen, 1981) 
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that also reported no significant sex differences, or only 3- and 5-way interactions that were 
not discussed any further (Marmor, 1975, 1977).  
One possible explanation for conflicting results regarding sex differences in infants’ 
mental rotation abilities may lie in differences of stimulus presentation. The infant studies 
that found sex differences used computer-generated 2D videos of 3D stimuli on a black 
background (Moore & Johnson, 2008; Schwarzer et al., 2010) and 2D letters on white 
posterboard (Quinn & Liben, 2008). The studies that did not find sex differences in infants so 
far used 3D live presentations on puppet stages (Frick & Wang, 2012; Hespos & Rochat, 
1997; Rochat & Hespos, 1996) and thus provided much more three-dimensional information 
about the object and its spatial environment. The present study used video presentations; 
however, the videos were taken from real 3D objects that were filmed against a stage-like 
background that provided substantial depth information. Furthermore, infants had the 
opportunity to see or even touch the real object prior to the task. Thus, information about the 
three-dimensional quality of the objects during or before the mental rotation test may serve to 
reduce sex differences.  
Overall, our study showed that 6-month-old infants are capable of performing mental 
rotations, even in a task that tested multiple rotation angles and prompted infants to initiate 
mental rotations by themselves. Thus, the present study demonstrates precursors of mental 
rotation abilities using a task that is more comparable to mental rotation tasks in adult studies 
than the ones used in previous infant studies. However, an essential precondition for infants’ 
ability to perform mental rotations in our task was prior manual exploration of the stimulus 
object. Thus, our findings support theoretical accounts that posit a central role of motor 
experience for cognitive abilities (e.g., Bruner et al., 1966; Gibson & Pick, 2000; Kosslyn, 
1978, 1980; Piaget, 1952/1936; Piaget & Inhelder, 1956/1948, 1971/1966).  
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This research presents an initial step toward clarifying the role of action experience in 
infants’ cognitive processes. However, the underlying mechanisms of the observed 
facilitation effects are yet unclear. It can be ruled out that infants’ active engagement in the 
exploration phase might have simply led to more visual experience with the object, based on 
the finding that infants’ looking times toward the object during both encoding phases did not 
differ significantly. If anything, it is very probable that infants in the manual exploration 
group received less visual information, because sometimes their own hands were obstructing 
the view. In addition, it may be conceivable that active engagement in the exploration phase 
might have led to an increase in visual attention during the test phase. In fact, results indicate 
that infants were generally more attentive to subsequently presented events after manual 
exploration. However, this explanation cannot fully account for the result that infants 
selectively looked longer at the impossible events. It is more likely that a deeper encoding of 
the object during manual exploration led to a more stable mental representation of the object, 
which in turn enabled infants to maintain their mental representation and thus made it more 
resistant to decay. In fact, this interpretation is supported by research (Wilcox, Woods, 
Chapa, & McCurry, 2007) showing that infants were more likely to attend to object 
properties (e.g., color) after combined visual and tactile exploration. The authors 
hypothesized that bimodal exploration of objects facilitated the formation of more detailed 
and robust representations than visual exploration alone.  
This brings into question whether facilitation effects are specific to manual experience 
or whether any bimodal encoding would be beneficial. There is in fact evidence that bimodal 
information does not always help. For example, Bahrick, Lickliter, and Flom (2006) showed 
that 3- and 5-month-old infants did not detect an orientation change of an object after 
receiving bimodal (audio-visual) information, but after unimodal (visual) information. 
Whereas in this case the auditory modality did not provide relevant information about how 
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the object was oriented, the motor system may be especially suitable as a secondary source 
for encoding spatial and spatio-temporal (i.e., movement) information. In our study, manual 
exploration may have drawn infant’s attention toward spatio-temporal stimulus properties and 
thus may have helped them to form a dynamic representation of the object and to mentally 
simulate the rotational movement. 
Interestingly, manual exploration was beneficial, even though infants were tested at 
an age when they had just begun to systematically reach for and grasp objects (starting 
around 5 months, cf. Needham et al., 2002) and bimodal manual and visual exploration 
emerges (Rochat, 1989). Nevertheless, 6-months-olds were able to integrate the information 
from two sources in order to form more robust representations and successfully rotate them. 
Multimodal integration of visual and haptic input may be especially important at this age, and 
the focus of infants’ attention may lie especially on motor information. This interpretation is 
in line with Piaget and Inhelder’s work (1956/1948), positing that starting around the age of 4 
to 5 months (at the stage of ‘secondary circular reactions’) infants begin to systematically 
manipulate objects and to coordinate vision with grasping. This enables infants to distinguish 
their own movements from those of the object, and to coordinate different views of the 
object.  
Based on these considerations, it would be informative to investigate whether motor 
development and individual differences in the development of grasping and bimodal 
manipulation skills are systematically linked to mental rotation performance. There is indeed 
evidence for effects of motor development (Schwarzer et al., 2010), showing that crawling 
boys outperformed non-crawling boys in a mental rotation task. This raises the question of 
what the underlying mechanisms of this facilitation could be. One possibility is that 
experiencing a self-initiated change in perspective may enable infants to think about space in 
more allocentric terms. That is, they may start to think about spatial relations between objects 
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(or objects and agents) independent from their own location and perspective. Another 
possibility is that locomotor status may be an indicator of motor development in general, and 
that children who are early walkers are also able to sit independently early, opening up more 
opportunities to manually explore objects. Our results that 6-month-olds succeeded in our 
task only if they had the opportunity to touch the object prior to the test even just for a few 
minutes, shows that the ability of young infants to engage in mental rotation is strongly 
affected by manual experience. This has two major implications. First, it suggests that 
individual differences found later in development (e.g., Levine et al., 2005) may to a large 
extent be caused by differential experience, as opposed to being genetically pre-determined. 
Second, our results highlight the importance of embodied experience in cognitive 
development and suggest that providing opportunities for manual exploration may be 
instrumental in promoting mental rotation abilities and in designing training programs and 
early interventions.  
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Figure Captions 
 
Figure 1. Front (top row) and back sides (bottom row) of the symmetrical object (“T”) used 
in the familiarization events, and the asymmetrical objects (“p” and “q”) used in 
the test events. 
Figure 2. Sequence of a test event (from top to bottom) with examples of a possible (left) 
and an impossible (right) outcome. Dashed lines indicate the trajectory of the 
stimulus object.  
Figure 3. Mean looking times at possible and impossible test events for infants with manual 
exploration and observational experience. Error bars represent standard errors. 
Figure 4. Mean looking times at possible and impossible test events by outcome orientation 
for infants with manual exploration and observational experience. Error bars 
represent standard errors. 
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